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Abstract
The ideas of continental philosopher Martin Heidegger have been influential in cognitive science and artificial intelligence,
despite the fact that there has been no effort to analyze these ideas empirically. The experiments reported here are
designed to lend empirical support to Heidegger’s phenomenology and more specifically his description of the transition
between ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand modes in interactions with tools. In experiment 1, we found that a smoothly
coping cognitive system exhibits 1=f b type positively correlated noise and that its correlated character is reduced when the
system is perturbed. This indicates that the participant and tool constitute a self-assembled, extended device during smooth
coping and this device is disrupted by the perturbation. In experiment 2, we examine the re-organization of awareness that
occurs when a smoothly coping, self-assembled, extended cognitive system is perturbed. We found that the disruption is
accompanied by a change in attention which interferes with participants’ performance on a simultaneous cognitive task.
Together these experiments show that a smoothly coping participant-tool system can be temporarily disrupted and that
this disruption causes a change in the participant’s awareness. Since these two events follow as predictions from
Heidegger’s work, our study offers evidence for the hypothesized transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand.
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Introduction
Ever since the influential critiques by Hubert Dreyfus [1,2]
researchers inAI and cognitivesciencehavebeen interestedin,orat
least aware of, the work of phenomenological philosopher Martin
Heidegger. Initially, Dreyfus argued that Heidegger’s insights into
the nature of human thinking and experience made artificial
intelligence impossible. More recently, it has been argued that
Heidegger’s insights into the nature of thinking and experience
lead to a different approach to creating artificial intelligence and
studying cognition scientifically [3–8]. Despite widespread attention
in cognitive science and artificial intelligence to Heidegger’s work,
this interest has remained largely conceptual and no effort has been
made to put Heidegger’s theory in an experimental framework. A
search of the PsycINFO database on December 10, 2009, found no
articles concerning Heidegger that involved laboratory work. The
reasons behind this lack of an experimental approach are easy to
understand once one acknowledges that phenomenology is not a
psychological discipline and there is no established correspondence
between the two; one cannot directly test Heidegger’s concepts
using the tools of psychological science because his is not a
psychological theory. Yet, the current paper makes a first attempt to
fill this gap by deriving testable predictions that follow from specific
aspects of the philosopher’s work. The use of phenomenological
studies to inform experimental design, an approach called front-
loading phenomenology, has been proposed as one way to naturalize
phenomenology [9].
The portion of Heidegger’s philosophical thinking that has been
considered relevant to cognitive science is found in Division I of his
great early work Being and Time. In this paper, we follow the
‘‘analytic’’ interpretation of Heidegger’s work (e.g., [10]). This is
appropriate, whether or not it is the best way to understand
Heidegger, because the analytic reading is the only one that has
had any influence in the cognitive sciences. In Chapter III of Being
and Time, Heidegger distinguishes three modes of experiencing
the world. Most human activity, Heidegger argued, is absorbed,
skillful engagement with entities in the world. When we are coping
skillfully with the world, we experience entities around us as ready-
to-hand. To use Heidegger’s example, a hammer is encountered
ready-to-hand, as a piece of equipment, when it is being simply
used to drive in nails. Our engagement with entities ready-to-hand
does not involve explicit awareness of their properties; instead, we
‘‘see through’’ them to the task we are engaged in. When we are
smoothly driving in nails with a hammer, our focus is on the thing
we are building not the size or shape or color of the hammer.
Heidegger argues that skilled coping, when we engage with
entities as ready-to-hand, is our primary way of engaging with the
world. Sometimes, though, our skillful coping is temporarily
disturbed. When this happens, we encounter entities as unready-
to-hand. When we go from smoothly hammering to having
difficulty, our experience of the previously ready-to-hand entities
changes: we experience the hammer, nails and board as failing to
serve their function appropriately. The hammer is too light or
heavy, the nails are too soft, the board has an unfortunately placed
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rience them as frustrating our coping with the world, and we must
focus closely on our activity. As Blattner [11] puts it, unreadiness-
to-hand is a deficient mode of readiness-to-hand. We are still using
the piece of hardware to complete a task, but our experience of the
situation has changed. We can no longer ‘‘see through’’ the tool to
focus on the task; instead, we must explicitly attend to the unready-
to-hand object that the tool has turned into.
Heidegger’s third way of experiencing the world is as present-at-
hand. The hammer is encountered as present-at-hand when we
stop hammering and consider the hammer’s shape or color or
weight; when considered this way the hammer is no longer a useful
tool but merely an object with various properties. Heidegger
argued that readiness-to-hand is primary in two ways. First, the
majority of our experience of the world is engaging with entities
ready-to-hand. Second, readiness-to-hand is, from a phenomeno-
logical standpoint, ontologically primary while the other modes
are derivative of it. The true nature of the tools we experience is
their way of being ready-to-hand. Thus, a hammer is primarily
something used in building, and only secondarily something we
are temporarily having trouble using or something with a
particular shape, color and chemical composition.
Even these very brief remarks are enough to make sense of what
many have taken to be the import of Heidegger’s phenomenology
for the cognitive sciences. When you are smoothly coping with a
hammer that is ready-to-hand, the ready-to-hand hammer recedes
in your experience, and your focus is on the task you are
completing. Your experience of the hammer is no different than
the experience of the hand with which you are wielding it. This
has inspired the hypothesis of extended cognition, i.e., the claim
that cognitive systems sometimes extend beyond the biological
body [6,12–16]. Hammers and other tools that are ready-to-hand
are literally part of the cognitive system. When a tool malfunctions,
however, and becomes unready-to-hand, it becomes the object of
primary concern; it is no longer part of the extended cognitive
system, rather it is the thing that that the cognitive system is
concerned with.
These remarks also point to Dreyfus’s critique of artificial
intelligence, at least as it was practiced in the 1960s and 1970s in
what Haugeland calls Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI). In
GOFAI, a system’s knowledge of the environment is represented
as a series of logical propositions. Thus, a GOFAI system’s
representation of a hammer might include the following: it is a 1-
inch diameter cylinder, with a complex shape attached to one end
and a rubber coating on the other; it weighs 22 ounces; the center
of inertia is very close to the end with the complex shape; it is
made of steel; portions of it are painted blue, other portions are
unpainted; it can be used to hammer nails. But if Heidegger is
correct about our modes of engagement with the world, humans
are typically unaware of the weight, shape, color and center of
inertia of hammers. Instead they encounter them as ready-to-
hand, while using them to hammer nails. In fact, most of the time
when humans encounter hammers, they are not explicitly aware of
any of their properties: they use them skillfully, seeing through
them to the task at hand. Knowledge representation in GOFAI is,
perhaps, sufficient to capture the way humans experience things as
present-at-hand. But this is not the way humans typically
experience things, nor is it the way things most fundamentally
are. Thus, Dreyfus argued, AI (circa 1960s and 1970s) would
never succeed, nor would any scientific psychology that shared its
assumptions.
Things have changed dramatically in AI and cognitive science
since the time Dreyfus made these arguments, and at least some of
the changes have been made explicitly in response to Dreyfus’s
critiques. But notice that the Dreyfus arguments depend on
the correctness of Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis. The
credibility of Heidegger’s analysis of our ways of engaging with the
world has, thus far, depended on something like its face validity:
think about your experience, does it match up with what
Heidegger describes? Of course, not everyone gives the same
answer to this question.
The two experiments described below provide the beginning of
an empirical basis for Heidegger’s phenomenology: in particular,
they demonstrate thecorrectness of hishypothesizedtransitionfrom
readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand. In order to investigate
this transition, we constructed in the laboratory a situation involving
equipment that participants are already familiar with. The
participant plays a simple video game, using a computer mouse
directly linked to a pointer figure on a computer screen to steer a
target figure into a designated area (See Figure 1a). The task
resembles a video game version of herding, as when a dog keeps a
sheep inside a proscribed area. What allows the participant to guide
the target is that it always tries to escape away from the pointer in a
semi-predictable fashion. To make an analogy to Heidegger’s
example, here the mouse plays the role of the handle and the on-
screen pointer figure plays a role similar to that of the hammer
striking face. About thirty seconds from the beginning of the trial a
perturbationinthemapping between mousemovementand pointer
movement instantiates equipment malfunctioning. It lasts a few
seconds and then the situation returns to normal.
Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy would predict that
prior to the perturbation, the participant in the experiment will
Figure 1. The visual playground environment. A single frame (a) captured during the course of a trial is shown and visible inside it are the pen,
the gray center, and blue and green dots for the target and pointer objects, respectively. Representative pointer and target object trajectories on the
screen from three-second excerpts with a normally behaving (b) and impaired (c) mouse are portrayed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g001
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perturbation, the mouse will become unready-to-hand and the
participant will be forced to focus her attention and cognitive
resources on the mouse and mouse-pointer coupling and, by
necessity, away from a secondary cognitive task. In the first
experiment, we use relatively novel tools to analyze the dynamical
structure in the hand-mouse movements to examine at the level of
motor control the nature of skillful coping and its breakdown
induced by the temporary disturbance in mouse behavior. In the
second experiment, we show that this disturbance causes an
attentional shift and a temporary re-allocation of cognitive
resources. For the sake of consistency, the two experiments used
the same experimental design, that is, both experiments involved a
herding motor task and a verbalized counting cognitive task with
only slight differences in some parameters.
Ideally, we would be able to show explicitly that attention is
shifted towards the misbehaving tool as it has lost its transparency.
In the current study we are restricted only to an implicit test,
namely, attention to a second task is reduced, which is what the
ready-to-hand to unready-to-hand transition in conjunction with a
contemporary understanding of attentional resources predicts.
Experiment 1
Using motion-tracking equipment we recorded the three-
dimensional trajectory of the hand-tool system (from now on
called the hand-tool for simplicity). Research on the generation of
purposeful motor behavior in comparable tasks demonstrates that
the variability of the movement time series has an intrinsic role in
the generation of the movements, and is not mere additive noise
‘‘blurring’’ the signals coming from the central nervous system (for
a review, see [17] or, for a more analytical critique of the
conception of noise and signal in physiology and the life sciences
in general, [18]). In order to characterize the fluctuations in
the movements of the hand-tool before, during, and after the
perturbation, we applied an analysis that has been used to establish
long-range correlations in the time series which are expressed as
1=f b type noise in the frequency domain [19]. The significance of
1=f noise for behavioral data and for our experiment needs special
attention.
The technical meaning of classifying variability in human
behavior as 1=f noise [20] is that activity magnitude scales across
the frequency spectrum invariantly, that is, as a power-law with
unity exponent b in 1=f b. Usually the discussion of 1=f noise in
behavioral time series includes the more general class of 1=f b type
noise without positing a categorical difference between the two as
long as 0vbƒ1 [21,22]. Data where 0vbƒ1 are also said to be
a long-range correlated series or have long memory, and this
notion of long memory has become the epitome of scale-invariant
behavior [23,24]. Testing for the presence of a power-law long
memory process at the motor control level is the main goal of the
first experiment. Such power-law scaling has been associated with
a sort of extended cognitive systems that will be argued to follow
from Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy. van Orden et al.
[21] and Holden et al. [25] argue that 1=f b noise found in an
inventory of cognitive tasks is a signature of a softly assembled
system exhibiting and sustained by interaction-dominant dynamics, and
not component-dominant dynamics. In component-dominant dynamics,
behavior is the product of a rigidly delineated architecture of
modules, each with pre-determined functions; in interaction-
dominant dynamics, on the other hand, coordinated processes
alter one another’s dynamics, with complex interactions extending
to the body’s periphery and, sometimes, beyond. When, as part of
an experiment, a participant is repeating a word, a portion of her
bodily and neural resources, along with environmental support
structures, assemble themselves into a ‘‘word-naming device’’ [21,
p.346]. Device assembly as the product of interactions within and
across the temporal and spatial scales of elemental activity can
account for the 1=f b character of behavioral data, while assembly
by virtue of rigid components with predetermined roles and fixed
communication channels cannot [26]. Thus we can take the
presence of a 1=f b long memory process as indicative of the
activity of a smoothly operating system, softly assembled by virtue
of interaction-dominant dynamics. For the sake of brevity, we use
the initials ‘‘IDS’’ to designate such systems.
By looking for 1=f noise recorded at the interface of body and
tool, we address the hypothesis that, while smoothly operating an
instrument, a human performer instantiates such an IDS spanning
the extended body-tool system. The first of the predictions from
Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy that we laid out in the
introduction can now be expressed in a more operational form.
1. When participants are smoothly operating the tool to play the
computer game, i.e., when the participants are interacting with
the tool as ready-to-hand, it becomes part of the IDS solving
the problem posed by the game. Given this, we predict that the
variability recorded at the body-tool interface is 1=f b type noise
or a long memory process.
2. When, during the experiment, the connection between mouse
movements and pointer movements on the screen is perturbed,
the participants should experience a breakdown in their
smooth coping and, consequently, experience the tool as
unready-to-hand. When this occurs, we predict that the
variability recorded at the body-tool interface will not have
1=f structure, showing a disruption in the IDS.
The experiment involved an additional cognitive task of
counting backwards by three out loud. This task was only used
to keep the conditions consistent across experiments, however, and
performance in it was not assessed.
Experiment 2
Even if the results of experiment 1 successfully reveal that the
hand-tool, as a part of a larger smoothly-coping IDS, becomes
functionally removed from it during the perturbation, this would
only go part of the way to demonstrating Heidegger’s proposed
transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand. Hei-
degger’s distinction also implies a change in experience: since we
can no longer see through the unready-to-hand entity to the task
we are using it to complete, it will attract our attention and
consequently impair performance in a secondary task. For this
reason experiment 2 employed a divided attention paradigm and
focused on the secondary cognitive task of counting out loud. Put
in terms of experiment 1, the participant shifts from attending to
the counting and the ‘‘herding’’ tasks to needing to attend to the
counting, herding, and tool handling tasks. To validate this
emergence of an additional object of attention we interpret the
task of experiment 1 within the light of longstanding results in
cognitive psychology concerning attention and cognitive abilities
[27,28]. Attention is a limited resource; changing the way that
attention is allocated among multiple tasks affects cognitive
performance [29–31]. This suggests that the redistribution of
attentional resources accompanying a shift from readiness-to-hand
to unreadiness-to-hand should have an impact on the performance
of a demanding cognitive task. This leads to the prediction that
counting rate with mouse perturbation will decrease, as partici-
pants are able to allocate less attention to that task. Consequently,
our study can support the validity of the hypothesized transition by
way of finding data that conform to a theory-derived prediction.
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Participants and Procedure
Experiment 1 was approved by the University of Connecticut
Institutional Review Board. Experiment 2 was approved by the
Franklin & Marshall College Institutional Review Board. All
participants in both experiments signed informed consent forms.
Undergraduate students (N~12) at University of Connecticut
participated in the first experiment for credit. At the beginning, the
experimenter explained that the nature of the task was to
investigate motor control in the context of playing a computer
game while also performing an additional cognitive task: verbally
counting backwards by three. In regard to the main task, the
specific instructions given were to, first, try to keep the target figure
within or as close as possible to the gray circle in the middle of the
‘‘pen’’ area and, second, not let the target leave the screen. An
example of performing both tasks was given and then the
participant was allowed a few practice trials with no mouse
perturbation. The goal of the practice trials was to make sure the
participant could maintain control over the target object on the
screen while also counting. Once the participant felt comfortable
with both tasks, six experimental trials were performed. Because
participants were allowed practice trials and conditions were
exactly the same in every trial, there was no need for more than six
trials. Furthermore, we did not want practice effects to interfere
with our results as participants began to expect the perturbation.
Experiment 2 took place at Franklin and Marshall College and
used the same design as experiment 1 with a few small
modifications. All participants (N~13) were given a similar set
of instructions as in experiment 1, plus that they would be
videotaped during the experiment. After they became comfortable
with the dot herding task during practice trials with no
perturbation, they were introduced to the additional counting
task, i.e. counting backwards by three. Only a single experimental
trial was necessary because the analysis of cognitive performance
was much more straightforward than the motor behavior one and
the effect of the perturbation was quite telling.
Apparatus
The participants sat in front of a table with a computer,
monitor, and a mouse. A custom Matlab (Mathworks, Natick,
MA) script was used for a 60-second-long visuomotor coordination
task involving the mouse and monitor. We took advantage of the
PsychoPhysics Toolbox [32–34] the main purpose of which is to
give our script nearly real-time control over the computer
operating system kernel. Before each step the script records
current mouse position and prepares a frame with pointer and
target locations. A frame is sent to the screen for update every
35 milliseconds. The result is a seemingly real-time relation
between mouse and pointer and between pointer and target.
Before a trial starts, a target blue dot and a mouse-controlled
green pointer dot stay in the center of a playground area
delineated by a red ellipse - the pen - on the computer screen.
Beginning with the start of the trial, the pointer is released and the
target starts being displaced away from the pointer by a vector
defined by the following equation
tnz1~tnza(tn{pnz1)zbg ð1Þ
where p,t5R2 are vectors of the computer screen Cartesian
coordinates for the pointer and target objects, respectively, a and b
are experimenter-assigned parameters determined during pilot
trials, and the vector g 5R2 is a noise term taken from a pseudo-
random uniform distribution. The vectors pnz1 and tnz1 are
calculated while frame n is on the screen and then projected
simultaneously in order to create frame nz1. This means that the
movement of the pointer figure and reaction of the target figure to
it always lag a few milliseconds behind the actual mouse
movements. This, however, seems to be an unnoticeable lag.
Furthermore, it is close to the ranges of regular computer
operation and, hence, does not constitute a departure from the
kind of tool we expect our participants to be familiar with.
The participant controls the pointer via the mouse and tries to
keep the target within a small gray area in the center of the pen. In
order to reduce the likelihood of exponential divergence in terms
of the target disappearing from the screen, its escape away from
the pointer is scaled down by the parameter a%1. Additionally,
the noise term in the target behavior prevents the participant from
approaching and trapping the target object under the mouse
pointer and, thus, establishing asymptotic convergence to a steady
state.
Establishing these constraints makes the task strikingly resemble
pole-balancing. We purposefully fashioned the current task as a
simulation of balancing a pole on a finger where the target object
stands for the pole’s center of mass projected onto the hand’s plane
and the pointer object stands for the point of contact between pole
and finger. The more the pole tilts, the more its center of mass
goes away from the point of contact and eventually the pole falls
down. Meanwhile, establishing completely stable control is
impossible, and one has to sway her finger along with the pole.
In such a study Treffner and Kelso [35] suggest that the
configuration of the task near such critical instabilities allows the
behavior to unfold across multiple spatial and/or temporal scales.
This gives our approach even more validity since the authors
utilized similar time series analysis techniques to confirm 1=f b type
noise.
During the initial period the mouse performs as a properly
functioning mouse would. Beginning at a point in time randomly
chosen from the interval 30 plus or minus six seconds after trial
onset, a 3-second-long perturbation in the relation between the
mouse and the pointer on the screen instantiates a malfunctioning
mouse. The pointer dot is not directly mapped from the mouse
coordinates to the screen. Instead, an ‘‘error’’ dot location was
assigned according to the following expression,
perror~pnz1zcg ð2Þ
where c&a, b is an experimenter-assigned parameter, and the
vector g5R2 is a noise term taken from a pseudo-random uniform
distribution. The result is that for three seconds the pointer object
jumps around its ‘‘proper’’ location on the screen as assigned by
the mouse and consequently it becomes hard to control. (See
Figure 1.)
OptoTrack motion-tracking apparatus (Northern Digital Inc.,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada) using a separate computer stored the
three-dimensional coordinates of a hand marker at a sampling rate
of 875Hz. We used a velcro band taped around the proximal
phalanx of the ring-finger to secure the infrared marker. All six
participants used the right hand to handle the mouse.
The verbal counting task requires starting from a randomly
chosen number between 90 and 100 and counting backwards by
three. The participant was told to start over from 100 if she reached
zero before the end of the trial. In the second experiment, we
simplified and made more reliable the encoding of the cognitive
performance dependent variable by setting the perturbation to
always begin precisely 30 seconds into the trial and last for six
seconds. Additionally, a starting number of 400 was chosen for the
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three-digit numbers. No motion-tracking apparatus was involved
and, instead, a digital video camera was placed behind the
participant and aimed towards the monitor screen to record the
whole session and was used later for the encoding of counting rate.
Analysis of Motor Behavior
The data in experiment 1 were analyzed using Detrended
Fluctuation Analysis (DFA), a technique which allows us to
estimate a coefficient of temporal correlation in a time series
[36,37]. Since Mandelbrot [38] proposed to generalize Brownian
motion using fractional Brownian motion as including correlated
displacements, several related techniques for quantifying the noise
(the derivative of the trajectory) have been developed. While the
coefficient b in 1=f b, the slope in the logarithmically transformed
frequency power spectrum, estimates power-law scaling of activity
amplitude in the frequency domain, the a exponent from DFA
estimates power-law scaling of variability in the time domain, and
both a and b quantify temporal correlations in the time series [37].
We chose to use a here instead of b because, first, these two
coefficients are related as b~2a{1 [19,39], and second, DFA has
some advantages over other methods with respect to its robustness
to non-stationarities in the data [40]. In the context of behavioral
measurements, DFA has been applied to a wide range of studies,
including heartbeat [41], walking [42], postural sway [43], tapping
to a repetitive signal [22], and EEG recordings [44].
The analysis begins with transforming the data into the
appropriate variable. The raw data was filtered using a 60-Hz
low-pass filter and down-sampled by a factor of 10. Only lateral
displacement of the mouse in the horizontal plane of the table was
used because a one-dimensional time series is sufficient for
applying DFA and similar techniques. The filtered lateral position
data was differenced twice to obtain the acceleration. The
acceleration series is the relevant variable here since it corresponds
to the active control on the part of the participant, i.e., the
participant’s active changes of the movement of the mouse. In
order to make a correction in the trajectory of the mouse related to
inducing a correction in the trajectory of the target, the participant
needs to apply force on the mouse, that is, change its acceleration.
The input data (see Figure 2) with length N is integrated to form
the cumulated sum or profile. Then, a series of fluctuation
functions F(n), the RMS of the residuals of a linear regression fit
inside each block of a sequence of all consecutive blocks with size
n, is calculated per size n of the observation window according to
the following equation
F(n)~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
X N
k~1
y(k){yn(k) ½ 
2
v u u t , ð3Þ
where y(k) is the integrated time series within a block and yn(k) is
the linear trend in the same block.
In a step-by-step fashion, the algorithm can be described as
follows. The first block y(1) with length of n samples is taken from
the integrated time series and the linear trend inside it, calculated
by fitting a first-order polynomial, is subtracted from it. The
operation is repeated for all consecutive non-overlapping blocks of
data with length n. This is the detrending step which produces a
series of residuals with length N. Finally, all terms in the residuals
series are squared and the root is taken from their mean to obtain
F(n). Next, the same procedure is repeated using a different value
for the binning parameter n.
Naturally, F(n) increases as n increases but more importantly,
in case of a linear relationship between them in a log-log plot as in
Figure 3, the exponent in the power-law relation F(n)*na
corresponds to the scaling parameter and has been used to identify
persistent or positively correlated process when :5vav1 [42]. In
the special case when a~1 it is equivalent to ideal pink 1=f 1 noise.
Thus, finding values of a significantly higher than .5 indicates the
presence of 1=f b type noise, and hence a smoothly operating IDS.
Figure 2. A portion of the analyzed acceleration data from a
representative trial. The section in the middle delineated with
vertical bars was collected while the mouse was malfunctioning.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g002
Figure 3. Fluctuation functions from representative five-second blocks covering behavior with proper (a) and malfunctioning (b)
mouse.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g003
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the hand-tool displacements during the whole trial, we applied
DFA recursively to 5-second-long blocks with increments of
4 seconds. Figure 4 portrays a series of a-coefficients for a given
trial. In order to evaluate the effect of mouse perturbation, the
coefficients were divided into three groups and averaged to obtain
mean coefficients for the blocks covering the time series before,
during, and after the perturbation.
Analysis of Cognitive Performance
Using the video recording we encoded the number of times a
number was pronounced during each of 10 consecutive 6-second-
long blocks within a trial. Consequently, three average counting
rates per participant for the periods before, during, and after
perturbation were obtained by dividing the total number of counts
in the blocks covering a period by the respective number of blocks.
For example, the average pre-perturbation counting rate is the
number of counts for the first five blocks divided by five.
Results
Scaling Coefficient a
First, we evaluated the hypothesis that hand-tool displacements
analyzed for each of the three groups of averaged a-exponents
exhibited 1=f b type positively correlated noise diverging from the
a~:5 level characteristic of white noise. Separate t-tests indicated
that the pre-perturbation (M~:631, SE~:035) and post-
perturbation (M~:612, SE~:032) ones diverged, t(11)~3:79,
pv:01 and t(11)~3:52, pv:01. The perturbation group,
(M~:579, SE~:029), albeit barely, also made it to the level of
a significant difference, t(11)~2:71, pv:05, with a lower
confidence interval boundary at :51. Repeated measures ANOVA
(RMANOVA) with perturbation-relative order as independent
variable and averaged a coefficients as dependent variable,
illustrated in Figure 5, indicated a significant effect of perturbation,
F(2,22)~8:03, pv:01. Accordingly, the mouse perturbation
reduced the long-range correlation in hand-mouse displacements
relative to the ones in pre-perturbation (pv:05) or post-
perturbation (pv:05) periods. The latter two did not differ
(p~:07).
Counting Rate
Four participants had to be excluded from the analysis of
Experiment 2 because two failed to perform the motor task
accurately, that is, they allowed the target to leave the playground
area, and two others forgot to restart the additional cognitive task
after the perturbation. For the remaining nine (N~9), consistent
with the motor behavior results in Experiment 1, RMANOVA
with perturbation-relative order as independent variable revealed
a significant effect of perturbation on counting rate, F(2,16)~
14:99, pv:001. Illustrated in Figure 5, pairwise-comparisons
revealed that the average counting rates for pre-perturbation
(M~2:17, SE~:24) and post-perturbation (M~2:00, SE~:24)
did not differ (p~:32) but were both significantly different (pv:01)
from counting rate during perturbation (M~:67,SE~:20).
Discussion
Noise at the Body-Tool Boundary
In Experiment 1 we find evidence to support our prediction that
during skilled task performance the behavior of the hand-tool will
exhibit the kind of power-law scaling associated with 1=f noise
[18]. Consequently, although one can distinguish anatomically
between separate behaving components, i.e., parts of the tool,
body segments, neural pathways, etc., the task performance is
more appropriately understood by taking the tool to be
functionally integrated into a larger IDS, the body-tool IDS. As
expected, a sudden alteration of the connectivity between certain
components disrupted task performance generally. Since dynamics
play a constitutive role in a softly-assembled perception-action
device [21,45], their disturbance leads to disruption of the integrity
of the device. This disruption is manifest in the significant decrease
of the scaling coefficient characterizing long-range correlations, or
‘‘whitening’’ of the noise while the mouse misbehaves. Notice that
while the anatomical relation between the mouse (the tool handle)
and body has not changed, functionally they act much more like
separate components interacting on a restricted local scale as
portrayed by Figure 6 a and b. That is, the mouse switches from
being an intrinsic part of a self-assembled device solving a certain
problem to the problem that a newly assembled IDS has to solve.
While we aimed for an obvious categorical distinction between
tool dynamics with and without perturbation, we observed only a
drop in the scaling coefficient without a complete transition to a
behavior characterized by white noise. Yet, this is not necessarily a
weakness in our argument. Remember that Heidegger never
establishes in a precise manner the nature of the unreadiness-to-
hand as a special mode of being of equipment. Instead, it is placed
in a gray area between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand
and is usually regarded as a deficient, still a subordinate mode of
Figure 4. DFA results per block for a representative trial. The x-
component of the lines stands for the time coordinates of the analyzed
block and the y-component is the scaling coefficient obtained for that
particular block. The red lines in the middle are the ones that cover the
perturbation section of the trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g004
Figure 5. Means of the main measures used in the two
experiments. Counting rates are averaged across consecutive 6-
second-long blocks. Error bars are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g005
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During pilot trials we tuned the magnitude of the perturbation so
that is does not give rise to a complete break-down; the participant
was capable of maintaining a certain level of control throughout.
During experimentation only two participants proved incapable of
performing the task with the perturbation and allowed the target
figure to escape from the pointer figure by leaving the screen.
Hence, it makes sense to say that, just as it is in Heidegger’s
example, we instantiated a situation where the tool misbehaves but
retains some of its ‘‘usability’’. Consequently, our reliance on
dynamics at the tool-hand interface to parallel the phenomeno-
logical description of the two modes - readiness-to-hand and
unreadiness-to-hand - is justified. We observed a certain level of
long-range correlations with both a properly and improperly
behaving tool, but the exponent was decreased significantly in the
latter case.
Another important clarification is needed here. Information
about the mouse never stops being available to the participant,
even during a period of perturbation. This is a crucial point since
for an object to be phenomenologically unready-to-hand, the user
needs to be interacting with it. We are not arguing that the flow of
interaction between tool and body is reduced in magnitude, just
that it is reduced in complexity. The mouse keeps providing
sufficient local stimulation through the eyes and the sense-organs
of the arm for the agent to maintain overall control over it, as
when one is holding a foreign object in hand and is trying to figure
out a specific property of it.
Cognitive Load
In accordance with our hypothesis, Experiment 2 revealed that
the effect of the motor perturbation apparent in the significant drop
in counting rate is not localized to the body periphery but extendsto
other levels of behavior involved with the task. This satisfies the
second criterion for our operationalization of Hedeigger’s proposed
transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand. Before
the perturbation, the tool, by way of the mouse, its handle, is
functionally a component of the smoothly coping IDS. Experiment
1 showed that this is less so during the perturbation. If this
disruption of smooth coping constitutes also a shift from readiness-
to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand, the mouse handling will start to
emerge as another object of attention. This would increase the
participants’ cognitive load, and lead to decreased performance in
some of the ongoing cognitive tasks.
Because experiment 2 tracks attention only indirectly, other
explanations of the decrease in counting rate are possible. We
believe that the attentional shifts due to increased cognitive load is
the most plausible explanation of the decreased counting rate,
especially considering the simplicity of the experimental task. In
support of this interpretation of the results, it is worth noting that
our reason for excluding two participants from our data analysis is
that they completely discontinued the counting task during
perturbation and, furthermore, failed to restart counting after
the perturbation. We take this is as indicating that, for these
participants, the perturbation caused such a profound shift in
attention to the herding task that the counting task was excluded
entirely.
It is important that participants could easily bring performance
back to its regular state of affairs. Probably it takes some time to
recover from such an environmentally-induced attentional strain.
The average post-perturbation counting rate and a, however, were
not significantly lower than the respective pre-perturbation values.
This allows us to maintain that we have correctly created a setup
involving the mouse, screen, and specific game that is not too taxing
forourparticipantsevenduringperturbationandallowsthemtouse
a tool they are fairly familiar with, something that is another line of
convergence with Heidegger’s description of ready-to-hand.
Figure 6. A schematic of two distinct model agent IDSs. The IDSs (delineated by the surrounding curves) are fluidly or softly assembled by
virtue of rich interactions on multiple scales (double-sided arrows) among the components (black dots and hammer) are portrayed. They either span
across (A) or do not (B) the tool (hammer). It is assumed that the black dots stand for bodily structures. Notice that interaction between the tool and
the agent is present in both cases but in (B) it is impoverished, i.e. constrained to a single scale. Customarily, one studies such systems by collectinga
time series locally from the behavior of a single point of observation (C), that is, from a single element. Next, if possible one establishes their character
as an IDS by searching for power-law scaling of certain statistical quantities (D) as it was done, for example, in [21,25,26]. The two fluctuation function
plots representative of our data exemplify analysis of the behavior of the tool in (A) and (B) and were obtained using DFA which we applied instead of
power spectrum analysis. The scaling coefficient a reveals long-range correlations characteristic of 1=f noise in the hand-tool in normal mode (A) and
approaches the uncorrelated white-noise level in (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.g006
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According to Eq. 2, the pointer behaves erratically, but it still
follows the mouse roughly. During pilot trials we tuned the
parameters a, b, and c such that the task became challenging but
not impossible even at its hardest stage. In this way we created the
conditions for the tool to become obtrusive and to require some
attention without interrupting the experimental tasks. This comes
closest to Heidegger’s notion of unready-to-hand. But one can
extrapolate from the current study and imagine the extreme case
of total tool breakdown when the pointer stops responding to the
mouse at all. Then, the motor behavior would most likely be
discontinued and the participants’ attention would be diverted
completely away from herding and counting. This would be an
example of presence-at-hand, Heidegger’s third mode of being for
equipment.
General Discussion
As noted in the introduction, Heidegger’s phenomenology has
been influential in the cognitive sciences, despite the fact that no
attempts have been made to empirically confirm his insights. The
experiments in this paper support Heidegger’s description of the
transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand, a phe-
nomenon that is key for his overall phenomenological philosophy.
When humans are smoothly coping with entities ready-to-hand,
they see through their tools to focus on the task they are using those
tools to complete. When that coping is disrupted by a temporary
malfunction, humans can no longer see through the malfunctioning
tool and experience it as unready-to-hand. We demonstrated this
transition by showing that when participants smoothly operate a
mouse in a video game task, the body-tool performance displays the
complex dynamicstypicalofan IDS. Temporarily disruptingmouse
behavior temporarily disrupted this IDS, at least at the body-tool
boundary. We also showed that this disruption led to a
reconfiguration of the participants’ awareness of the situation by
showing a shift in resources allocated to an additional cognitive task.
This is closing in on Heidegger’s transition from readiness-to-hand
to unreadiness-to-hand. We take these experiments as progress
toward justifying the influence that Heidegger’s phenomenological
philosophy has had on cognitive sciences and justifying the partly
Heidegger-inspired claim that cognitive systems sometimes extend
beyond the biological body.
A major challenge in using experimental work to validate
phenomenological observations is that these might seem to be two
orthogonal planes. This is why we needed to check our predictions
related to extended cognition as derived from Heidegger against
predictions derived from an additional theoretical approach to
perception-action [21,25,26]. More interestingly, in the context of
the current study these two perspectives enriched each other’s
predictions. Without the notion of a self-assembled device with
interaction-dominant dynamics resulting in 1=f b noise, it would be
hard to predict what kind of change of motor behavior would
result from a perturbation of smooth coping. Similarly, until one
considers Heidegger’s discussion of ready- and unready-to-hand,
speaking of an IDS as incorporating or failing to incorporate a tool
does not necessarily inform you of the size and direction of the
impact on awareness that a functional perturbation of that tool is
going to have. The combination of the two approaches provides
for a model that explains the observed data.
The experiments described above have two further implications.
First, Experiment 1 lends support to an untested hypothesis found
in [21]. Particularly, the authors claim that 1=f b noise character-
istic of cognitive behavior should be observable even in relatively
fast scales of motor activity at the periphery of the body, and not
just in tasks the responsibility for which is traditionally attributed
solely to the central nervous system. Second, the experiments
provide further evidence in favor of the hypothesis of extended
cognition. That is, our demonstration of the presence of 1=f b long
memory process during smooth coping and its reduction during
perturbation of that smooth coping supports the notion that the
body-tool instantiates an IDS.
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